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Abstract
We propose a model where voters experience an emotional cost when they observe a
rm that has displayed insu¢ cient concern for other peoples welfare (altruism) in the
process of making high prots. Even when there exist few truly altruistic rms, an
equilibrium may emerge where all rms pretend to be kind, refraining from charging
abusiveprices to their customers (or exploitingworkers). Our main result is that
as competition decreases, the set of parameters for which such pooling equilibria exist
is smaller and rms are more liekly to anger voters by displaying low levels of altruism.
As a consequence, when rms have been shown to be unkind, the welfare of consumers
will go up when these rms are punished (for example through nes), even when this
does not imply a change in prices. Indeed, regulation a¤ects welfare through three
channels: First, there is the standard channel whereby a reduction in monopoly price
lads to the production of units that cost less than their value to consumers. Second,
regulation calms down existing consumers: a reduction in the prots of a rm viewed
as excessively selsh increases total welfare by reducing consumer anger. Finally, there
is a third (mixed) channel arising because individuals who were out of the market when
they were excessively angry in the unregulated market, decide to purchase once the rm
is regulated, reducing the standard distortions described in the rst channel.
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1 Introduction
Governments routinely regulate markets, particularly those where there is a tendency to-
wards little competition. One possible explanation is that such regulation improves e¢ ciency.
Indeed, economists have developed normative theories of regulation, explaining how social wel-
fare increases when such regulation adopts a particular form. For example, forcing a monopoly
to increase output might be desirable because in a monopoly equilibrium the cost to the rm
of an extra unit is less than the value given to it by the consumer (see, Pigou, 1938, La¤ont
and Tirole, 1991, inter alia).
Given how far the logic of this explanation is from anything that voters seem to have in
their minds when they think about regulation or when they go to the polling booth, it is
useful to develop alternative theories that give weight to public opinion in the determination
of policies that regulate business. Although most existing models do not focus on such pop-
ulist dynamics, they are central to our paper, which emphasizes the role of emotions in the
motivation of consumers (that is distinct from a material motive). Thus, we assume that
consumers experience and decisions can be understood by studying total utility, constructed
as the sum of a material payo¤ and an emotional payo¤. Psychologists and some economists
have gathered evidence on several emotions that are candidates to be part of the second term.
One that appears to be particularly relevant for the setting we seek to describe, whereby a
monopoly might abuseits market position and set exploitationprices, is consumer anger.
There are several episodes where consumers appear to react with anger in the face of price
increases. The title of an article in a British newspaper describes one such emotional reaction:
Fare increases of up to 15% anger rail passengers.1 Earlier on in history, the era of the big
trusts and the rise of regulation in the US is frequently described as a period where consumers
experienced emotional reactions to business activities.2 More recently, riots and widespread
anger have been linked to price increases in Bolivia. During January-April 2000, the city of
Cochabamba witnessed a popular revolt after the newly privatized water company increased
the tari¤s. Protests included the occupation of the citys main square on February 4 in an
incident that left 22 people wounded and 135 under arrest (See, Darocca Oller, 2004).3 There
1See, The Guardian, Tuesday, January 1, 2008. According to the article passengers and rail user watchdogs
reacted angrily yesterday to outrageousnew year price increases which will see the cost of some train tickets
rise by almost 15%. The new prices were also described as unjustied and unfair. It also reports that one
Gerry Doherty, leader of the TSSA (the union for people in transport and travel) described the increases as
outrageous.
2Even later, with anti-trust regulation in full swing, the review of the book The Muckrakers, which
appeared in Time Magazine on Friday, December 21st, 1966 was titled A Time for Anger. Archives of Time
Magazine, accessed on October 28th 2008.
3Conditions do not seem to have improved as a result. A report explains that people of this high Andean
city were ecstatic when they won the water war. . . . .After days of protests and martial law, Bechtel - the
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are several other episodes where emotions occupy center stage in the process whereby some
form of punishment or regulation of business is put into place, including the 2008-9 subprime
crisis in the US, although these are often dismissed as populist episodes and often involve
indignation at actions that may be broader than price increases.
Psychologists have investigated several characteristics of angry emotional reactions. Some
of the evidence gathered aims at distinguishing anger from other negative emotions, such as
sadness or shame. For example, it suggests that anger is correlated with the belief that redress
is still possible and that remedy requires (even indirectly) the intervention of the self. It also
indicates that others (as opposed to the situation or the self) were responsible for the negative
event (see, for example, Ellsworth and Smith, 1985, and Lazarus, 1991, as well as the review of
Lerner and Tiedens, 2006).4 An important nding for our purposes is reported in Lerner and
Tiedens (2006), whereby anger makes people indiscriminately punitive (and optimistic about
their own chances of success). There is also some evidence that anger does not seem to reect
a xed personality trait of left-leaning individuals (with no connection to the stimulus), as in
some experiments people can be induced to feel angry (and sometimes even provide what is
the typical right wing answer). For example, Small and Lerner (2005) found that individuals
induced to feel anger choose to provide less public assistance to welfare recipients than those
induced to feel other emotions, while Bodenhausen et al (1994) found them to engage in more
stereotyping. Less of this research has concerned itself with emotional reactions following
price increases, although Tyran and Engelmann (2005) were able to generate experimental
evidence on boycotts following increases in prices in the lab.
We study a model where an individuals experience as a client of a monopolistic rm
improves when the price paid falls and the prots of those rms perceived as unkind go
down.5 The rst of these two terms the material payo¤- is standard in economics, while the
second term the emotional payo¤- captures the demand for fairness that has been analyzed in
several recent models in economics such as Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Falk and
Fischbacher (2005), inter alia. In particular, we follow Levine (1998) and Rotemberg (2008)
and assume an individuals kindness towards others depends on their estimation of how kind
American multinational that had increased rates when it began running the waterworks - was forced out.
. . . Today, ve years later, water is again as cheap as ever, and a group of community leaders runs the water
utility, Semapa. But half of Cochabambas 600,000 people remain without water, and those who do have
service have it only intermittently - for some, as little as two hours a day, for the fortunate, no more than 14.
See Forero (2005).
4Other negative emotions follow alternative appraisals: sadness (rather than anger) follows negative events
that are blamed on situational forces whereas shame follows personal responsibility.
5Anecdotal evidence suggests that anger often arises at the announcements of high prots by rms that are
under scrutiny. See, for example, Railtrack prots spark anger, reported on BBCNews online, Thursday,
November 4, 1999. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/504329.stm. Accessed on Tuesday October 28th ,
2008.
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others have been in relationships with them.6 This allows Levine (1998) and Rotemberg
(2008) to have agents who are spitefultowards others that are perceived to have behaved
unkindly to the decision maker, a feature that plays a key role in our theory of regulation of
monopolists. Note that this specifcation naturally leads to a signaling game, since individuals
actions can reveal how altruistic they are. Thus, we do not require that there be a a large
fraction of truly altruistic rms for the equilibrium to be heavily inuenced by altruism.
Finally, part of the attraction in applying these preferences to the demand for regulation is
that it may help explain both the amount of regulation, and some instances of arbitrary or
redistributive regulation (such as when nes are applied to rms by populistgovernments)
and of ine¢ cientregulation (i.e. the type of regulation may not be optimal from a standard
economic e¢ ciency perspective).7
We develop a model of price competition along the lines of Salop (1979), but where con-
sumers react with anger when they conclude that the rm has shown low levels of altruism
towards them. Given the strength of consumer reactions to high prices by monopolistic com-
petitors, there is a signaling game where it often pays for rms to act as if they were kind.
This leads to a set of pooling equilibria, where consumers are not angry. The main result of
the paper is that when the number of rms falls and competition decreases, the set of prices
where a pooling equilibrium can be sustained is smaller. That is, as competition decreases,
anger is more likely and leads to higher welfare losses. In this context, regulation might in-
crease welfare through three di¤erent channels. First, there is the standard channel whereby
a reduction in monopoly price lads to the production of units that cost less than their value to
consumers. Second, regulation calms down existing consumers: a reduction in the prots of a
rm viewed as excessively selsh increases total welfare by reducing consumer anger. Finally,
6Although there are di¤erences (Levines preferences are linear) in our context they lead to similar implica-
tions. One reason is that, although in Rotemberg the individual is angry or not whereas in Levine the anger
is continuous, the tradeo¤s in Levine are linear, so the optimal amounts of regulation (or of punishment) are
corner solutions: the individual wants either no punishment or as large a punishment as possible. Rotemberg
(2006) explains how the minimal altruismpreference relations he denes explain a wide range of behavior
in ultimatum and dictator games.
7Another instance where anger may be the driver of regulation is the rise of political pressure on CEO pay
following the 2008-9 nancial crisis. A report in the Financial Times explains Gordon Brown, the prime
minister, has said he would use the governments banking aid package to clamp down on compensation, adding
the days of big bonuses are over. And then describes how the Financial Services Authority actions reected
this heightened pressure. For example it states The letter does not have the status of mandatory guidance,
but the FSA has said it would increase the regulatory capital requirements for banks that do not su¢ ciently
link pay with risk. See FinancialT imes, Monday October 13, 2008. With respect to forms of regulation,
we note that a literature within regulation has explained the particular forms that are adopted at particular
times, and the growth in the size of the market plays a key role in the explanations for why private litigation is
substituted by ex-ante regulation during the progressive era in Glaeser and Shleifer (2003). Rotemberg (2001)
is able to explain the choice of commercial policy (tari¤ vs quotas) using altruistic preferences.
4
there is a third (mixed) channel arising because individuals who were out of the market when
they were excessively angry in the unregulated market, decide to purchase once the rm is
regulated, reducing the standard distortions described in the rst channel. Note that one
of the most visible ways that regulation a¤ects rm prots is by regulating prices, but the
mechanism also allows nes (when they are credible) to play a similar role. Our theory con-
nects the publics appreciation of rms with the extent of competition, noting that positive
appraisals of big monopolies would be harder to maintain. This connection is emphasized in
the literature on the history of public relations of large American corporations. For example,
Marchand (1998) states The crisis of legitimacy that major American corporations began to
face in the 1890s had everything to do with their size, with the startling disparities of scale.
(Marchand, 1998, p. 3). Indeed, it is possible to argue that there is a parallel between our
papers focus on the concept of commercial legitimacy and the concept of State legitimacy in
political science.
Closest to our paper are models that study price rigidity when consumersutility functions
display psycholgically realistic features. In particular, Heidhues and K½oszegi (2008) study
prices and competition focusing on the possibility that consumers are loss averse and discuss
the emergence of focal points and its implications for price rigidity. Rotemberg (2005) on the
other hand, focuses on the same set of preferences as this paper (consumers get angry when
rms display insu¢ cient levels of altruism), developing a new model of price rigidity and
analysis of monetary policy. Our model, which extends their analysis of realistic preferences
to the context of regulation, is related to theories of exploitation by big rms. Marxist theories
emphasize how capitalist institutions (including private ownership of the means of production
and an accomplice State) lead workers to pay surplus value(see Brewer, 1987, inter alia).
In our theory, consumers have a simple approach to deciding when such exploitation takes
place (they measure rm altruism) and are not alienated or passive (they get angry). The
problem with monopoly is that consumers cannot go to other rms when these misbehave,
and because of this rms are more likely to do so.
Interestingly, our approach to regulation and emotions is connected to capture theory. The
Chicago and Virginia schools argue that regulations are the product of interest group activity
(see, for example, Stigler, 1971, Peltzman, 1976, Buchanan, 1976, Djankov et al, 2002, inter
alia). The basic idea is that regulations are correlated with prots across industries and
that this could reect the interaction of groups in society, with di¤erent costs and benets of
organizing to obtain favorable regulations. Indeed, noting that the Civil Aeronautics Board
has not allowed a single new trunk line to be launched since it was created in 1938and other
examples where the regulatory actions appear to benet rms, Stigler (1971) concludes that
the most plausible explanation for their existence is rm demand for protection and regulation.
Such demand for regulation on the part of rms and other interest groups has occupied the
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majority of positive theories of regulation. Whereas the public could in principle be treated
as an interest group, as in the more modern generalizations of the theory (see, for example,
Becker, 1983, Baron, 1994, Grossman and Helpman, 1994, inter alia), the emphasis there is
on material payo¤s and the public typically ends up with a low inuence on the nal outcome
given the well known problems of free riding in voting. Note however, that Stigler himself
refers to the publics demand for regulation, but it seems that he believed that it could not
be modeled. When explaining the existence of regulations that harm social welfare, he states
the second view is that the political process dees rational explanation: politics is an
imponderable, a constantly and unpredictably shifting mixture of forces of the most diverse
nature, comprehending acts of great moral virtue (the emancipation of slaves) and of the most
vulgar venality (the congressman feathering his own nest). Our theory of regulation focuses
on fairness (and anger) and thus is capable of explaining the type of regulatory phenomena
Stigler is concerned about.
In section II, we introduce the basic model, whereas in Section III we present the main
results. Section IV discusses some implications and extensions while section V concludes.
2 The model
There are n consumers, each characterized by a parameter x interpreted, as in Salop (1979),
as either a preferred varietyor as a location parameter. For each consumer, his location
is drawn from a uniform distribution on the circle of circumference 1. There are m evenly
distributed rms along the circle (there are m rms, but we use b = 1=m as the relevant
parameter); rms are of one of two types, altruistic or selsh; the prior probability that a
rm is altruistic is q. Consumers want to buy (at most) one unit of the good, for which they
would obtain a gross surplus of s (gross of price and transport costs). If they have to travel a
distance x; and then pay a price of pi; their net surplus is s tx pi (i.e. they have a transport
cost of t per unit of distance traveled). In addition the consumer may be angry with the rm
from which it is buying. In that case, we must subtract to his utility, a term  ( + p  c)
where p is the price he is paying to the rm, c is marginal cost, and  is the prot the rm
obtains from the other customers. This term is just a spiteterm: when angry, the consumer
dislikes the rms making a prot, and he is angrier when he contributes to those prots. As in
Rotemberg (Levines preferences are observationally equivalent in this setting) what triggers
anger is that the consumer rejects the hypothesis that the rm is altruistic.
Firm i chooses a price pi; and has a cost c; so when demand for its product is Di; its prots
are (pi   c)Di: If the rm is not altruistic, that is all there is in the rmsutility (utility =
prots). If the rm is altruistic, its utility is prots plus a term that depends on the utility of
the consumer. The altruistic rm has a cost of  if consumer utility is lower than a certain
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level (this level is exogenous for this model, but can come from learning, adaptation, history,
etc). We call the threshold  ; we will set it to be the utility the consumer would obtain in a
fairly competitiveindustry (see Section 5 for an example).
In what follows, and without loss of generality, we normalize t = 1 and all other parameters
are just normalized by t. This normalization is completely general. We also assume (without
loss of generality) that the number of consumers is n = 1:8 Finally, we restrict s to be s  c+1;
which ensures that in a monopoly not all consumers are served.
2.1 Equilibrium
We will analyze a signalling game, in which rms choose a price which signals their type. An
equilibrium in this setting is a triplet [a (p; x;) ; p () ; (p)] where:
 a () is an acquisitiondecision strategy (the same for all consumers; we are looking
at symmetric equilibria) as a function of price, tastes x (or distance) and beliefs  (of
whether the rm is altruistic or not) into f0; 1g ; where a = 1 means buyand a = 0
means dont buy;
 p () is a function that maps types into prices (one price for each type; the same function
for all rms);
  () is a function that maps prices into [0; 1] ; such that  (p) is a number that represents
the probability that the consumer assigns to the rm being altruistic.
 a is optimal given x; p and ; p is optimal given a (and other rms playing p);  is
consistent (it is derived from Bayesrule whenever possible).
Whether we are analyzing pooling or separating equilibria, we will focus on equilibria
where beliefs are of the sort I reject the rm is altruistic if and only if its price p is such that
p > pwhere p is the equilibrium pooling price p; or the equilibrium price of the altruistic
rm in a separating equilibrium (that is, p = p (a) for a the altruisitc type). We are ruling
out (for example) equilibria in which the consumer rejects that the rm is altruistic if the
rm charges a price p 6= p (i.e. we do not allow that the consumer comes to believe the rm
is selsh even if it could be charging a price below the targetprice); in standard signalling
models, beliefs like these may still be part of an equilibrium, because in equilibrium one does
8Our general formulation with n consumers is not equivalent to a formulation where there is a continuum
of consumers of mass n (the standard assumption). In the continuum formulation, a consumers purchase does
not a¤ect the rms prots, and so anger is irrelevant. Formally, our formulation is equivalent to a formulation
with a continuum of mass n of consumers who dislike buying from a selsh rm (this is di¤erent from disliking
the rm having high prots, because as argued, a consumers purchase does not a¤ect rmsprots).
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not observe prices p < p and so the consistency condition (that beliefs be derived from Bayes
rule) places no constraints on beliefs. We are also ruling out equilibria in which the consumer
rejects that a rm is altruistic i¤ its price is p > p; and in equilibrium the altruistic rm
charges a price p (a) < p:
2.2 Parameter restrictions
We will assume throughout that s   c   3b
2
 0 for all b  1
2
; or s  c + 3
4
: This assumption
ensures that in an oligopoly, the market is covered. This is a non-triviality assumption,
since otherwise an oligopoly behaves just like a group of local monopolies.
We will also assume that s  c+ 1: This condition ensures that the market is not covered
when there is a monopoly, which is the relevant case for studying anger.
Regardless of the parameter restrictions, in the Appendix, we show that utility is always
higher in an oligopoly, and that price is always lower in a monopoly. We note however, that
this counter-intuitive nding is also true in the setup without anger.
3 Oligopoly
In this section we characterize the symmetric pooling equilibria in an oligopoly: both types of
rm charge the same price. Of course, there may be separating equilibria too. But we focus
the analysis of pooling equilibria for four reasons.
1. The rst is analytic: we want to know whether the set of parameters for which there
exists a pooling equilibrium shrinks as the number of rms decreases; since there is no
anger in pooling equilibria, this would establish that the chancesof anger appearing
are larger when there is less competition.
2. The second reason for focusing on pooling equilibria is historic: before the start of
regulation, we assume, there was no anger at rms; hence, we may presume that the
existing equilibrium was one with pooling (or maybe one with separating, but where the
rm was actually altruistic; but this wouldnt explain why later these same rms started
to behave as selsh rms).
3. The third is to avoid having to make choices for which there is little empirical evidence
indicating the right track, and that however we resolved them, would leave some readers
unhappy. For example in a separating equilibrium, consumers facing an unkind rm are
angry; when they are, the optimal price by the unkind rms is lower than if consumers
werent angry; this leads to a larger material utility for consumers. This leaves us
with the conundrum that selsh rms are giving angry consumers a higher material
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utility than to consumers who are not angry. This leads to a substantial question: are
consumers (in reality, not in the model) angry because the rm is selsh, or because
the rm acts in ways that harm consumers? Put di¤erently, how angry would you be
at somebody you know is nasty, but is temporarily pretending to be nice (not because
he is trying to change, but just to avoid some punishment)? Psychological research has
not answered this question in a satisfactory manner yet.
4. The nal reason is tractability: in a separating equilibrium when there are many rms
the patterns of combinations of rms becomes complicated (a selsh rm surrounded by
two selsh rms, or by one selsh and one altruistic, or by two altruistic, etc; similarly
for an altruistic rm and its neighbors). In ex-ante terms, though, each rm does not
know whether its neighbors will be of one kind or the other. Yet, once the uncertainty
about types of neighbors is resolved, a dynamic re-adjustment of prices would take place,
complicating matters further.
3.1 Pooling Equilibria
Our rst step is to nd necessary conditions under which a price po is part of a pooling
equilibrium in which consumers attain their target level of utility. The case of consumers with
low utility is qualitatively similar and adds no further insights.
Consider a rm who maximizes prots in a deviation from a pooling equilibrium with
price po (we are not including a utility cost of the deviating rm, since we assume for the time
being that the equilibrium is such that consumers attain their target utility level ). If the
rm lowers its price, consumers wont be angry. In that case, demand is given by the sum of
all (unit) demands of consumers who are closer to the deviating rm than the two consumers
(one to each side) who are indi¤erent:
s  p  x = s  po   (b  x), D = 2x = po   p+ b
Prots are then
(p  c) (po   p+ b) :
When the rm maximizes this expression, we obtain an optimal price of
p =
po + b+ c
2
:
For the rm not to want to deviate from po; it must be the case that this optimal price is
larger than po; or equivalently
b+ c  po: (1)
In words, if the oligopoly price is too large, the rms are better o¤ lowering their price, and
the consumers will not punish them (by getting angry).
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If the rm raises its price, consumers become angry, and demand is given by the condition
that
s  p  x   (p  c) = s  po   (b  x), D = po   (1 + ) p+ b+ c: (2)
In that case, prots are
(p  c) (po   (1 + ) p+ b+ c) :
For the rm not to want to deviate and charge the optimal price
p =
po + b+ c (1 + 2)
2 (+ 1)
)  = (p
o   c+ b)2
4 (1 + )
(3)
it must be the case that prots in the equilibrium are larger than these deviation prots.9
Formally,
(po   c) b  (p
o   c+ b)2
4 (1 + )
) po  c+ b
h
1 + 2  2
p
 (1 + )
i
: (4)
Notice that when  = 0 (the standard Salop case), we obtain from equations (1) and (4)
po = b+ c: (5)
An additional restriction is that for a given  ; as we decrease the number of rms the price
must also decrease to achieve the target utility. Consumer utility (in a pooling equilibrium
with price po) is the number of rms, 1=b; times the total utility of consumers served by each
rm (the 2 in the equation below is because each rms serves consumers to both sides):
2
b
Z b
2
0
(s  po   x) dx = s  po   b
4
: (6)
This utility is larger than  if and only if
s  po   b
4
  , s     b
4
 po: (7)
We now present an important result: as competition decreases (enough), anger is more
likely. The proposition shows that as competition decreases, a pooling equilibrium is less
likely. But since pooling equilibria have no anger, and separating equilibria do (in expected
terms there will be some selsh rms), when pooling equilibria disappear, anger appears.
Proposition 1 There is a critical n such that for all n  n0 > n; the set of pooling prices
is smaller when there are n rms than when there are n0: That is, as competition decreases,
anger is more likely.
9It could happen that the rm considers raising its price and discovers that the optimal price in the
deviation with angry consumers is lower than po (this happens if po is larger than the optimal price, given in
the previous equation). If that happens, the rm is better o¤ not raising its price. Hence, our assumption
that the optimal price in a deviation is achieved (with angry consumers) is justied.
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Proof. For b  4
5
(s  c  )  b = 1=n, we have
b+ c  s     b
4
so that the constraint in equation (7) is not binding, because the constraint in equation (1)
is tighter. For b > b; the situation is reversed, and equation (1) is binding but (7) is not.
Starting at b; increasing b (lowering competition) lowers the upper bound on po (the derivative
of s     b
4
with respect to b is negative) and increases the lower bound since the derivative
of the bound in equation (4) is positive: 1 + 2  2p (1 + ).
The plot below illustrates the three constraints on po: The price po must lie between the
two loci with positive slopes (the steeper one is equation (1) and the atter, (4)) which arise
from the rmsincentives not to deviate. The price must also lie below the negatively sloped
constraint (equation (7)) that arises from the condition that fewer rms imply lower prices (if
consumers are to obtain their target utilities).
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Bounds on p
Next we present another relevant result, connecting the cost structure of rms and the rise
in anger. As will be argued later, this link could be the cause of subsequent regulation. The
result provides a potential explanation for why people in less developed countries dont like
capitalism. If costs are larger and more volatile in LDCs, that would explain why capitalists
and capitalism are not popular.
Proposition 2 When costs increase, or when they become more volatile, anger is more likely.
Proof. When costs increase, the two loci of equations (1) and (4) move upwards by the
amount of the increase in costs. Since equation (7) is unchanged, the set of (b; p) pairs for which
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a pooling equilibrium exists shrinks. More importantly, if for a given b there was a pooling
equilibrium, there is an increase in costs that makes that pooling equilibrium impossible.
Symetrically, when costs fall, the set of pooling equilibrium prices increases. But a larger
volatility in costs makes it more likely that a high (pooling-breaking) cost will happen, and
then the selsh rms will reveal themselves as such and anger will arise.
The next result illustrates another obvious feature of the rise in anger: when for some
exogenous reason consumers become captive of one particular rm, anger is more likely.
The mechanism is as one would expect: when consumers elasticity of demand decreases, local
monopolies have an incentive to increase prices. The temptation may be large enough that an
anger-triggering price increase may be protable. The motivation for this result is the anger
expressed towards hotels that increased their prices in cities near New Orleans after hurricane
Katrina struck.
We model this increase in captivity by changing the transport cost of consumers going to
rivals, while keeping rivals prices xed.10 An equivalent way of modeling this is of course
assuming that the two neighbors of the rm being analyzed move farther away, as if there had
been a decrease in the number of rms.
Proposition 3 Assume that for a given parameter conguration, there is a pooling equilib-
rium with a price of po. If the cost of transportation to rms i   1 or i + 1 increases from 1
to t > 1; but the cost of getting to rm i remains constant, the rms incentives to raise its
price increase. There is a threshold t such that if t  t rm i raises its price and consumers
become angry.
Proof. When the cost of getting to rms i  1 and i+ 1 increases to t; the demand faced
by rm i (after an increase in price) and its prots, are
D = 2
po   p+  (c  p) + bt
t+ 1
 = (p  c) 2p
o   p+  (c  p) + bt
t+ 1
and the optimal price and prot are
p =
c+ po + 2c+ bt
2+ 2
)  = (p
o   c+ bt)2
2 (+ 1) (1 + t)
:
For large enough t; these prots exceed the oligopoly prot, and the rm raises its price,
causing anger.
In the above proposition we have assumed that the consumers continue to make inferences
based on the equilibrium prior to the shock. Although one could argue that a new equilibrium
10Keeping rivalsprices xed keeps competition constant for the rm being analyzed. Wouldnt rivals lower
their prices after consumerstransport costs to them increased? The assumption of xed rivals price reects
the simple idea that, for example, hotels in New Orleans were no longer available so, if anything, the price
would have been innity.
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(one with fewer rms) should be the benchmark, we believe that keeping the old equilibrium
beliefs is also plausible. In addition, the case of fewer rms also leads to more anger, as
established by Proposition 1.
Any price po in the range determined by equations (1) and (4) can be part of a pooling
equilibrium if we choose  or  appropriately. Note that if the rm is altruistic and it raises
its price enough, there could be a utility cost of providing consumers with a very low level of
utility. Since we found necessary conditions, we focused only on the incentives of the selsh
rm. When we want to build an equilibrium with a price po within the range we have just
identied, we need to take into account this utility cost for the altruistic rm. But choosing
 or  low enough, any one of these prices is an equilibrium. We do not elaborate, because
the construction is simple.
In order to compute what would consumer utility be in some market, so that we can set
the targetlevel of utility  at some reasonablelevel, we need to choose one of the possible
equilibrium prices. For the purposes of benchmarkingconsumer utility in each market, we
set po = b + c as in the standard Salop case without anger. Then, consumer utility is as in
equation (6):
2
b
Z b
2
0
(s  b  c  x) dx = s  c  5
4
b:
Here the denition of what utility to consider (for consumers) is not obvious. Why consider
total utility of all consumers? Maybe rm 1 is behaving really badly and slaughtering its
consumers, but still total utility is large in the market, and so rm 1 experiences no utility
cost. In equilibrium this will make no di¤erence (if rm 1 is treating its consumers badly, all
rms are doing the same), but it matters in a deviation. In the set of questions we will analyze
in this paper, this makes no di¤erence, but in general it would seem more psychologically
plausiblethat the rm cares about how it treats its consumers, and not about average utility
in the market (including the welfare of other rmsconsumers).
4 Monopoly
Let us analyze the conditions for a pooling equilibrium in a monopoly setting. For the selsh
rm, it must be the case that sticking with the equilibrium pm is better than deviating,
angering consumers, and getting (p  c)D; where D = 2x for x such that
s  p  x   (p  c) = 0, x = s  p (1 + ) + c:
Of course, it must also be the case that x  1=2 (otherwise, D = 1). For that to be the case,
we must have
p  s+ c 
1
2
+ 1
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(in the standard case, with  = 0; this just says that the individual located at x = 1=2 has
negative net surplus from buying the good).
Hence, prots for the selsh monopolist who deviates are
(p  c) 2 (s  p (1 + ) + c)) ps = c (1 + 2) + s
2 (1 + )
, dev = (c  s)
2
2 (1 + )
: (8)
So the condition on parameters for pm to be an equilibrium is that the equilibrium prots,
2 (pm   c) (s  pm) ; are larger than dev :
2 (pm   c) (s  pm)  (c  s)
2
2 (1 + )
) pm  c+ s
2
  s  c
2
r

+ 1
: (9)
One thing worth noting is that consumer anger has two di¤erent e¤ects on demand. First,
and most obviously, it reduces demand
dD
d
=
d (2 (s  p (1 + ) + c))
d
= 2 (c  p) < 0:
Second, and more subtle, is the e¤ect on the incentives of the rm (that is, the e¤ects on
marginal revenue). In this setting, price as a function of quantity D is
D = 2 (s  p (1 + ) + c), p = 2s D + 2c
2 (1 + )
which implies that marginal revenue is
pD =
2s D + 2c
2 (1 + )
D )MgR = s D + c
+ 1
:
Notice that in the standard model (with  = 0), marginal revenue equal marginal cost
implies that D = s  c: As  increases (from 0), the e¤ect on marginal revenue is given by
dMgR
d
=
D   (s  c)
(+ 1)2
which is negative for D < D = s   c and positive for D > D: Hence, for D < D, the
monopolist facing angry consumers has a smaller incentive to increase D (quantity demanded
is more sensitive to price, so increasing quantity marginally, requires a bigger drop in price
than before, when  was 0). Similarly, for D > D the monopolist facing angry consumers
has a smaller incentive to decrease quantity: But since the sign of MgR  c is the same as
before the change in ; the optimal quantity is the same as in the standard model:
D = 2 (s  pm (1 + ) + c) = 2

s  c (1 + 2) + s
2 (1 + )
(1 + ) + c

= s  c:
So far we have been concerned with the conditions that pm must satisfy to be part of a
pooling equilibrium, but only on those restrictions implied by the preferences of the selsh
rm. The next two subsections deal with the constraints that implied by the preferences of
the altruistic rm.
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4.1 Consumers with high utility
For the altruistic rm, utility in the equilibrium is 2 (pm   c) (s  pm) (we dont subtract 
because we are looking for a pooling equilibrium in which the consumer gets at least the
threshold utility level) and utility from the deviation is, for dev as dened in equation (8),
dev   : Of course, if one analyzes a pooling equilibrium in which consumers obtain high
utility, one needs to check that consumer utility in the monopoly deviation is less than the
threshold. So pm can be maintained as a pooling equilibrium if and only if
2 (pm   c) (s  pm)  (c  s)
2
2 (1 + )
  ) pm  s+ c
2
  1
2
r

+ 1
(c  s)2 + 2 (10)
Total consumer utility for a price pm is then
2
Z s pm
0
(s  pm   x) dx = (s  pm)2 (11)
4.2 Consumers with low utility
For the altruistic rm, utility in the equilibrium is 2 (pm   c) (s  pm)   . The rm has, in
principle, three alternatives
1. stick with the equilibrium monopoly price, which yields 2 (pm   c) (s  pm)  ;
2. deviating and charging consumers the optimal price. This raises the question of whether
the rms optimal price is above or below the price that would anger consumers and
whether it is above or below the price that would give consumers their threshold utility.
 First, the equilibrium monopoly price is pm  p (the optimal price of the altruistic
rm). This is always the case, since if the equilibrium monopoly price was higher
than p; then the altruistic rm could lower its price without being punished. Hence
a deviation to the optimal price must be with a higher price.
 Second, since the optimal price is higher than the equilibrium price, we conclude
that the equilibrium price must be the largest price for which consumers dont reject
that the rm is altruistic (otherwise the rms could have increased their prices
without being punished, and this price increase wouldnt do any additional harm
in terms of worsening the altruistic rms utility cost of consumers not achieving
their target utilities, since the rm is already paying that cost with the lowinitial
price).
 Third, as a consequence of the rst two points, since the deviation is with a higher
price, it must still leave consumers with a low (below threshold) utility.
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 All of the above ensures that an altruistic rm who deviates angers consumers, and
still pays the utility cost : The rms utility is then (c s)
2
2(1+)
  .
3. lowering its price enough to give consumers their threshold utility. Utility from the
deviation is, for the maximum p that yields the threshold utility, 2 (p  c) (s  p) : This
maximum price is dened by consumer utility (as in equation 11) equal  :
(s  p)2 =  , p = s p (12)
Then, the altruistic rms utility is
2 (p  c) (s  p) = 2  s p   c  s  s+p = 2p  s  c p : (13)
and the condition for a pooling equilibrium in which the consumer gets low utility is
that
2 (pm   c) (s  pm)    2p  s  c p) pm  c+ s
2
  1
2
q 
s  c  2p2   2
5 Example: Pooling in duopoly, no pooling in monopoly
We now show that if  is the utility with 3 rms, for some parameter congurations there is a
pooling equilibrium in which both types of rms choose the same price (resulting in no anger,
and consumers obtaining a highutility from consumption, u  ) with 2 rms. At the same
time, there is no pooling equilibrium when there is a monopoly. This results in consumers
being angry if the monopolist happens to be of the selsh type. The point of this example is
to show:
1. That anger is more likely in a monopoly, so the monopoly is the right model to look
at when focusing on anger.11 This is so, because the only equilibria without anger are
pooling equilibria (in any separating equilibrium, in expected terms there will be some
selsh rms, and so long as they charge a price larger than marginal cost, there will be
anger; and price equal to marginal cost is never optimal).
2. That there is some distance between assumptions and results. If we had chosen  to
be the utility attained by consumers in a duopoly and shown that there is no pooling
equilibrium in a monopoly, one could suspect that the no pooling result was the
consequence of focusing on a market structure di¤erent from the one used to calculate
the benchmark utility  . The example shows that that is not the case: the benchmark
11For di¤erent parameter congurations one can obtain anger also in an oligopoly; anger is not proprietary
of markets with a monopoly.
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utility is with 3 rms; one can still obtain that utility and a pooling equilibrium with
a di¤erent (more concentrated) market, in particular in a duopoly; the pooling only
breaks when moving to a monopoly.
Suppose  = 1
15
; s = 1; c = 0;  = 7
50
and  = 7
12
; corresponding to the utility of the
consumer in a market with 3 rms. Note that  = 7
50
= 0:14 is fairly small, relative to the
prots (maximum prots are: 1=2 in a monopoly with these parameters; and 1/4 for each
rm in a duopoly). We say that the altruistic motive is fairly small in the sense that it
is not larger than total rm prots in either the monopoly or duopoly (if it were, one could
argue that the altruistic motive is driving everything; we have that  is not too large, and
we obtain di¤erential behavior in the case of the monopoly vis a vis the duopoly)
5.1 No pooling in monopoly with high utility for consumers
The price in the monopoly situation must be, from equation (9),
pm  c+ s
2
  s  c
2
r

+ 1
=
3
8
for the selsh rm to want to pool. But such a price yields a consumer utility of 25
64
< 7
12
=  :
5.2 No pooling in monopoly with low utility for consumers
For the altruistic rm, the alternatives are
1. charging the equilibrium monopoly price and getting 2 (pm   c) (s  pm)  ;
2. charging its optimal price p > pm (leaving consumers angry and still with a low utility),
which yields (c s)
2
2(1+)
  .
3. lowering its price enough to satisfy consumers, which yields a utility given by equation
(13), 2
p
 (s  c p) :
But (1) is better than (3) i¤ pm (1  pm) 
q
7
12

1 
q
7
12

+ 7
100
= 0:25043 which is
impossible. We conclude that theres no pooling, because the altruistic rm always wants to
lower its price and satisfy consumers. (even though  is relatively small).
5.3 Pooling in duopoly
We consider a pooling equilibrium in which the price charged guarantees consumers their
acceptable utility level of 7
12
: Total utility of consumers for a price of p in a duopoly is:
4
Z 1
2
0
(s  p  x) dx = 4
Z 1
2
0
(1  p  x) dx = 3  4p
2
 7
12
) p  11
24
:
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We will show that p = 11
24
is indeed part of a pooling equilibrium. Prots for both types
of rm in the equilibrium are price times demand (half the market for each rm):  = 11
48
:
Faced with this price, neither the altruistic nor the selsh rm wants to deviate by de-
creasing its price. For both rms, the alternative is choosing p to maximize its prots in a
situation where consumers are angry and demand is given by the following condition
s  p (1 + )  x = s  p  

1
2
  x

, D = p   p (+ 1) + 1
2
=
23
24
  p (+ 1) :
Prots pD are maximized for
p =
23
48 (+ 1)
=
115
256
) dev = 2645
12 288
<
11
48
= 
and the altruistic rm has an extra utility cost of : Both rms are then happy to choose the
equilibrium price p:
6 Initial (unanticipated) Regulation of a Monopoly
In order to study regulation and its consequences for welfare, we make two assumptions. The
rst, is that the two types of the single rm and consumers are initially playing a separating
equilibrium. The reason is that with a pooling equilibrium there is no anger, and the premise
of this paper is that anger is an important factor in the rise of regulation. Our second
assumption is that when choosing the price to charge, the rm does not anticipate that if
it angers consumers, it will be regulated. Although the case of anticipated regulation is
certainly very interesting, we believe that the problem of the origin of regulation, when rms
were not aware of the possibility of regulation, is also interesting.
To study the rise of unanticipated regulation, we must rst characterize a separating
equilibrium in a monopoly.
6.1 Separating equilibrium in a monopoly
The initial situation is one in which there is a separating equilibrium; the type of equilibrium
we focus on is one in which beliefs are dont reject that the rm is altruistic if and only
if p  p for some the price p charged by the altruistic rm. Two cases can arise: for the
altruistic rm the consumers utility is above the threshold, or it is below.
If the consumers utility is below the threshold for the price of the altruistic rm in some
equilibrium, then both rms face the same incentives, and that cant be a separating equi-
librium (not a strict one at least12). The same is true if the consumers utility is above the
12The rm charging the high price would make more protsout of the larger price, but less from the
punishment, than the rm charging the low price. The two e¤ects would net out.
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threshold for both prices. Therefore, we will only focus on separating equilibria in which the
high price yields a utility below the threshold, and the low price a utility above the threshold.
That is, in the equilibria we analyze, we will have pa  p ; for pa the price of the altruisic rm
in equilibrium, and p the highest price that gives consumers their target utility when they
are not angry (as dened in equation 12), p = s p :
Lemma 1 In a separating equilibrium, the only possible price for the selsh rm is the price
that maximizes prots when consumers are angry:
ps =
c (1 + 2) + s
2 (1 + )
, s = (c  s)
2
2 (1 + )
: (14)
Proof. Suppose ps is not as in equation (14). Since ps is a (separating) equilibrium price,
consumers will know that the rm is selsh and will therefore be angry. Hence, playing ps
must be better than playing any price p for which consumers have rejected that the rm is
altruistic: (ps   c) 2 (s  ps (1 + ) + c)  (p  c) 2 (s  p (1 + ) + c) : But the right hand
side has a unique maximizer given by equation (14), so we obtain a contradiction.
We now nd the range of prices for the altruistic rm that can be part of a separating
equilibrium.
Lemma 2 In a separating equilibrium the price pa of the altruistic rm must satisfy
c+ s
2
  s  c
2
r

+ 1
 pa  s+ c
2
  1
2
r

+ 1
(c  s)2 + 2: (15)
Moreover, any price in that range can be sustained as a separating equilibrium, as long as it
gives consumers their target level of utility.
Proof. Necessity. For the altruistic rm not to want to deviate (upwards) and charge
its optimal price (the optimal price is the same as for the selsh rm) we must have (as in the
analysis prior to equation 10),
2 (pa   c) (s  pa)  (c  s)
2
2 (1 + )
  ) pa  s+ c
2
  1
2
r

+ 1
(c  s)2 + 2:
Similarly, the selsh rm must want to charge its equilibrium price, and not the maximum
price for which consumers are not angry, p: To connect this relationship with an upper bound
on pa; notice that we must have pa = min fp; pg. This is so, rst, because we must have
pa  min fp; pg for beliefs to be consistent, and for consumers to obtain their target utility.
Second, if we had pa < min fp; pg ; the altruistic rm could increase its price towards its
optimal price (without anger) c+s
2
; since
c+ s
2
>
c (1 + 2) + s
2 (1 + )
> p  min fp; pg > pa
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such a price increase would strictly increase its prots without lowering consumer utility below
 :
For the selsh rm not to want to deviate to p; we must have
2 (p  c) (s  p)  (c  s)
2
2 (1 + )
) pa  p  c+ s
2
  s  c
2
r

+ 1
and this establishes the upper bound for pa:
Su¢ ciency. It is straightforward to check that for any pa  p ; and pa in the range
dened by equation (15), there is an equilibrium with p = pa. This condition denes  as
 (p) =
(
1 p  p
0 p > p
:
Given this, the selsh rm optimally charges ps as in equation (14), the altruistic rm optimally
charges pa = p; beliefs are consistent, and consumers acquisition decisions are optimal given
their beliefs and tastes.
For an equilibriumwith pa  p to exist, we must have of course p  s+c2  12
q

+1
(c  s)2 + 2
(otherwise the range is empty). If we continue with the assumption that  is consumer utility
in some oligopoly with m = 1=b rms, so that  = s  c  5
4
b; the condition for existence of a
separating equilibrium becomes
p = s 
r
s  c  5
4
b  s+ c
2
  1
2
r

+ 1
(c  s)2 + 2:
Although, as usual, the set of equilibria is large, the Cho and Kreps Intuitive criterion
renement in this context yields that the price is as large as possible in the range determined
by Lemma 2:
pa =
c+ s
2
  s  c
2
r

+ 1
:
6.2 Regulation with market not fully covered
Recall that we had assumed s  c+1; which was the condition for the market not to be fully
served by a monopoly. We compare two types of regulatory policies: mandated prices for the
rms, and subsidies.
Consider a situation where there was a separating equilibrium and the rm turned out to
be selsh rm (think for example about the railroads in the US at the time of the Sherman
Act). What is total welfare? Consumer utility is, using ps from equation 8,
2
R s p (p c)
0
(s  p   (p  c)  x) dx

p=ps
=
(s  c)2
4
:
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Notice that consumer welfare is exactly the same as in the case where the consumers utility
is standard: the expression of consumer welfare is independent of . The reason is that,
while for each price less consumers would purchase because anger diminishes the incentives to
purchase, the monopolist lowers his price so that exactly the same number of consumers as
before purchases:
D
2
= s   (ps   c)  ps = s  

c (1 + 2) + s
2 (1 + )
  c

  c (1 + 2) + s
2 (1 + )
=
s  c
2
:
In order for the marginal consumer to be the same (with  > 0 or  = 0) the price decrease
must exactly o¤set anger; indeed, an increase in  decreases price ps
dps
d
=
c  s
2 (+ 1)2
< 0:
Since transportation cost (or taste) x is additive, the e¤ect on every other consumer is exactly
the same as with the marginal consumer, and therefore total utility is the same.
Just to repeat: the reason for the price decrease, is that demand becomes more elastic
when  grows. This lower optimal price leads to a decrease (relative to the standard case) of
the welfare of the rm:
(p  c)Djp=ps = (p  c) 2 (s   (p  c)  p)jp=ps =
(s  c)2
2 (1 + )
:
We now calculate the welfare in six cases: standard and anger model, crossed with 3
policies; laissez faire, regulated price p = c and a subsidy under which p = c and the monopolist
gets ps   c per unit from the government, as an incentive to lower prices to consumers. For
these calculations we assume that even for p = c; not all consumers are served.
In the standard model, as has been argued, the rm maximizes (p  c) 2 (s  p) ; charges
an optimal price of p = c+s
2
and obtains prots of  = (c s)
2
2
: The rest of the cases are given
by:
Firms Prots in Standard and Anger Models
Policy# Standard Model Anger Model
Laissez Faire (c s)
2
2
(s c)2
2(1+)
Regul. 0 0
Subsidy (p   c) 2 (s  c) = (c  s)2 (ps   c) 2 (s+  (c  ps)  c) = (+2)(c s)2
2(+1)2
Consumer welfare is given by
Consumer Welfare in Standard and Anger Models
Policy# Standard Model Anger Model
Laissez 2
R s  c+s
2
0
 
s  c+s
2
  x dx = (c s)2
4
2
R s+(c ps) ps
0
(s+  (c  ps)  ps   x) dx = (c s)
2
4
Regul. 2
R s c
0
(s  c  x) dx = (c  s)2 2R s+(c c) c
0
(s+  (c  c)  c  x) = (c  s)2
Subsidy 2
R s c
0
(s  c  x) dx = (c  s)2 2R s+(c ps) c
0
(s+  (c  ps)  c  x) = (+2)
2(c s)2
4(+1)2
21
Note that in the anger model, the consumer cares not only about how much he pays, but also
about how much the rm receives. In calculating the subsidy, we assume that the rm gets
ps; the price in the absence of regulation. Note that the consumer welfare is the same in the
absence of regulation; not only that, the consumer who is indi¤erent between buying and not
buying is also the same individual; the price reduction, that the monopolist must make in the
anger model, leaves the welfare of each consumer intact.
Then, total welfare in all scenarios is
Total Welfare in Standard and Anger Models
Policy# Standard Model Anger Model
Laissez (c s)
2
4
+ (c s)
2
2
= 3(c s)
2
4
(c s)2
4
+ (s c)
2
2(1+)
= (+3)(c s)
2
4(+1)
Regul. (c  s)2 + 0 (c  s)2 + 0
Subsidy (c  s)2 + (c  s)2 = 2 (c  s)2 (+2)2(c s)2
4(+1)2
+ (+2)(c s)
2
2(+1)2
=
(c s)2(2+6+8)
4(+1)2
Since consumer welfare with and without anger is the same, and the prots of the monop-
olist are lower with anger, total welfare in the economy is lower in the anger model.
The following table shows the gains to regulation: total welfare after regulation, minus
total welfare before regulation. An obvious point that we havent addressed yet is where is
the money for subsidies coming from? How is it counted in total welfare. We will address this
issue shortly.
Benets of Interventions in Standard and Anger Models
Policy# Standard Model Anger Model
Regul. (c  s)2   3(c s)2
4
= (c s)
2
4
(c  s)2   (+3)(c s)2
4(+1)
= (c s)
2(3+1)
4(+1)
Subsidy 2 (c  s)2   3(c s)2
4
= 5(c s)
2
4
(c s)2(2+6+8)
4(+1)2
  (+3)(c s)2
4(+1)
= (c s)
2(2+5)
4(+1)2
In both the standard and in the anger models the government subsidy equals the rms
prot: TA =
(+2)(c s)2
2(+1)2
is the transfer in the anger case and TS = (c  s)2 in the standard
case. It is easy to check that the subsidy is always larger in the standard case; yet, as we now
show, it is not the extra subsidy in the standard case that make subsidies less attractive in
the anger model. Let S RSt: be the di¤erence in welfare between Subsidies and Regulation in
the standard model (by how much more do subsidies increase welfare); similarly, let S RAng: be
the di¤erence in welfare between Subsidies and Regulation in the anger model. We have that
S RSt:  S RAng: = (c  s)2  
(c  s)2  4  32   2
4 (+ 1)2
=
1
4
 (c  s)2 (7+ 10)
(+ 1)2
> (c  s)2   (+ 2) (c  s)
2
2 (+ 1)2
= TS   TA
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Hence, imagine that due to the costs of raising the money (or the political economy costs)
the regulator was indi¤erent between the two policies when he thought the economy was a
standard one. If he learns that consumer preferences include the anger term that we study in
this paper, he would favor regulation without subsidies.
Although subsidies are less attractive than in the standard model, good old fashioned price
setting by the regulator is better in the model with anger:
(c  s)2 (3+ 1)
4 (+ 1)
  (c  s)
2
4
=
1
2

+ 1
(c  s)2 > 0
6.3 Three channels
In this model with anger, there are three channels through which regulation can potentially
increase welfare.
1. standard channel whereby a reduction in price from above marginal costs increases total
welfare by getting a good of cost c to be produced and transfered to a consumer who
values it at s:
2. for each consumer, who was purchasing and was angry, a reduction in price increases
total welfare by reducing his anger (because the rm is making lower prots).
3. any channel that reduces anger (whether it reduces price or not) induces people who
were out of the market to start buying the good, and that also increases total welfare.
Imagine for example a policy that kept the price xed, but expropriatedthe prots
from the rm. In that case, in the standard model, welfare would be unchanged. In the
current model welfare increases for two reasons: rst, each consumer who was purchasing
before, is happier. But also, some consumers who were not purchasing, will now become
customers.
7 Discussion
Our Results: The starting point of the paper is our assumption that total utility is made up of
a material payo¤ and an emotional payo¤. While the former is standard, the emotional payo¤
is assumed to become negative when agents that are perceived to be unkind do well, or more
precisely, when a rm that has charged excessiveprices makes positive prots. While other
specications for these emotional reactions might also be natural, this one is su¢ cient for our
purposes: rms in our model are extremely interested in appearing to behave altruistically
and often, though not always, charge relatively low prices so as not to irritate consumers.
Indeed in competitive markets (i.e., when there are still enough competitors in the market
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so that it pays for a selsh rm to pretend to be altruistic) the introduction of an emotional
payo¤ makes demand more elastic.13
It is worth pointing out that, in our paper, even though the introduction of emotions
introduces more discipline on rms in principle, it does not mean that there are lower welfare
gains from regulation. Indeed, when we study reductions in the numbers of competitors, we
note that when emotions matter, the increase in prices can be considerably higher than when
emotions dont a¤ect total utility. Put di¤erently, when there are few competitors, consumers
have a higher cost of punishingrms that misbehave (charge them high prices) by abstaining
from purchasing from them. This introduces a bigger role for regulation.
Relationship to Other Work : Our paper is related to previous research emphasizing the
fact that one important attribute that people look to see in prices is their fairness. In a
seminal paper, for example, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) noted a remarkable de-
gree of agreement amongst survey respondents in what changes in prices they considered fair
and which ones they did not. A small literature has studied the theoretical implications of
assuming consumerspreferences display a concern for fairness, including Rabin (1993), Fehr
and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfelds (2000), inter alia. Of particular interest for our
purposes are Levine (1998) and Rotemberg (2005, 2006), who assume that a persons altruism
towards others depends on his/her estimation of how altruistic others are in return. Introduc-
ing heterogeneity in agents preferences allows them to explain a wide range of phenomena
observed in dictator and ultimatum experiments (see the discussions in Levine, 1998 and
Rotemberg, 2006). Their specication of consumer preferences allows us to introduce a fea-
ture that is relevant in the regulation of monopoly: high prices sometimes anger consumers,
so there is a cost of monopoly that is closer to the informal descriptions of exploitationand
abuseobserved in the anecdotal evidence (which regulation and antitrust actions are seen
to address).14
Rotemberg (2005) describes how altruistic preferences can give rise to price rigidity. In
his model, missing on good deals gives rise to regret and facing prices that are unjustiably
high induces customer anger. He observes that the frequency of price adjustment can depend
on economy-wide variables observed by consumers and derives implications for the e¤ects of
monetary policy. While our specication of preferences is very much related, he does not
13Interestingly, Supreme Court judge Stephen Breyer mentions that an additional justication for regula-
tion (beyond e¢ ciency) is Fairness, by which he means that competition prevents rms from arbitrary or
unjustiably discriminatory exercise of personal powerand that a monopolist might be able to get away with
discriminating or more generally treating a customer unfairly. See Breyer (1982).
14See also the reactions to the 2009 subprime crisis, in particular the public fallout after it was disclosed that
some of the troubled rms had paid bonuses to their executives. One example is The Outrage Factor: Do
populist outbursts like the on sparked by the AIG bonuses represent a threat to capitalism -or an opportunity?
Our essayists on populism and its discontents, cover story in Newsweek, March 30, 2009.
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analyze how equilibrium outcomes depend on the level of competition, the main purpose of
our paper. Heidhues and K½oszegi (2008) on the other hand describe a market equilibrium
closely related to our paper (as it is also based in Salop, 1979). They also introduce a realistic
assumption of consumer preferences (in their case, it is that consumers have loss aversion, and
so a price increase is worse than a price decrease of the same magnitude). One inconvenience
for applying their model to study monopoly is that consumers who do not purchase do not
experience disutility. In contrast, in the monopoly setting it seems important that models
allow for the possibility that bystanders can get upset even when they are not themselves the
victims of exploitativeprices. Heidhues and K½oszegi (2008) develop a disciplined approach
where the behavioral model is based on the classic (intrinsic utility) model of Salop, and fully
endogeneize the reference point (as the lagged rational expectations point). In our model,
the predictions also reduce to Salops when there are no psychologically realistic features and
the fairoutcome is dened within the model (the outcome for the consumer when there is
a reasonable amount of competition). For a discussion of how a behavioral model becomes
generally applicable when it is based on a disciplined approach, see also K½oszegi and Rabin
(2006).
Relationship to Public Relations (the Practice and the particular Instruments): Given that
the public is keen to nd out which type of rms they face, there is ample room for rms
to try and inuence these perceptions. For simplicity, we only allow rms in our model to
signal their type through their choice of prices. But in reality, rms employ a variety of means
to inuence the perceptions of potential clients. For example, one interpretation of the large
amounts of money spent in public relationsis that they are an attempt to signal a kind
type by other (presumably cheaper) means than lowering prices.15 Similarly, it is possible
to interpret the particular form that such public relations e¤orts take in terms of our model.
For example, publicizing charitable actions (by the rm as a whole or by its founder or main
shareholders) cannot be easily interpreted when consumers care only about their material
payo¤s. A simpler explanation is that it is an attempt to inuence the perception of the type
of rm.16
15See, for example, Boyd (2000), Metzler (2001) and the discussion in Patel et al (2005). On the role of
status and how legitimacy confers power but depends on the support of stakeholders, see Pfe¤er and Salancik
(1978) and Suchman (1995).
16One of the rst and most famous of the public relations practitioners was Ivy Ledbetter Lee, who had the
Rockefeller family as a client. After the so-called Ludlow Massacre in 1913 (where striking miners and children
where eventually killed), Lee advised John D. Rockefeller to visit the mines personally and to advertise his
philanthropic activities (which had been secret up to then). See, for example, Bates (2002). Note that even
if potential clients were just altruistic towards the beneciaries of the rms charitable giving it is unlikely
that (in the absence of the signalling role of donations) they would favor the rms publicizing their largesse.
The reason is that the publicity might crowd out other donors (unless they think that this publicity will now
re-direct further giving by others, perhaps by raising awareness of the worthinessof this cause). It seems
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Another particular form of public relations that is consistent with our approach is that rms
often humanize corporations, emphasizing the identity of the founder or main shareholder.
One interpretation of this relatively common form of marketing is that by doing so a rm is
more likely to be perceived to have the attributes of humans (such as kindness) than of soul-
lesscorporations that only care about prots. Again, such language is unlikely to make
sense in a world where customers only care about material payo¤s. Figure 1 is taken from
Marchand (1998), who studies the role of corporate imagery in the creating and maintaining
the perception that corporations in America have a soul(interpreted by the author as forms
of kindness, tolerance and other positive human attributes).
Figure 1. An ad in the campaign by Bell Telephone System to humanize the corporation.
It depicts an elderly lady cooking and describes her as one of the many shareholders of
the telephone company. The caption also emphasizes that these are neither exceptional nor
sophisticated investors (occupations mentioned include housewife, miner, clerk, teacher), are
not opportunistic investors (more than half have held their shares for ve years or longer),
approximately half are women, and often hold small amounts (a large number of them own
5 shares or less, which was not a lot) for saving purposes (instead of speculation). In terms
of our model, we note that it is harder to get angry at higher prices when these are ultimately
beneting a gentle-looking, cooking grandmother than when the beneciary is a rich capital-
implausible that this is the primary logic that is triggered by the publicity of a rms charitable giving.
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ist. Interestingly, Marchand (1998) also mentions that it is related to an attempt to appear
democratic at a time when the big companies are perceived to have grown dramatically in
size relative to traditional institutions (the advertisement mentions that the Bell company is
a democracy run by the people it serves).
Note that it is unlikely that the public has good information about the structure of costs
faced by the rm. In that case a rm that is perceived as kind will be granted more tolerance
and allowed to charge relatively higher prices than an unkind rm in similar circumstances
without triggering consumer anger.17
Positive Theories of Regulation: Finally, the model has also some implications for a positive
theory of regulation. Most models emphasize the role of interest groups in lobbying and bribing
their way to favorable regulation, as in Stigler (1971). Our paper is complementary in the
sense that we give a role to the demand for regulation on the part of the public (rather than
on the part of rms) and the mechanisms we describe may also give rise to the set up of
regulatory bodies that are not carefully designed by benevolent policymakers (for example, it
may not consider the rmswelfare as part of the objective function).
It is worth emphasizing that the evidence available also suggests the opposite causal link
(from corruption to regulation), at least in some instances. For example, within a country,
individuals who perceive lots of corruption in the country are precisely those who declare to
want more regulation; and that this demand is stronger when big companies are thought to
be involved. Even over time, regulation bursts seem to follow corruption scandals (see, for
example, Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2002).18
This is consistent with the model we present: when capitalists are perceived to be corrupt
and unkind, voters demand regulation. Of course, in sophisticated legal systems, more e¢ -
cient punishment directed only at those that are perceived to be breaking the rules might be
available. In such cases, a descent into distrust and a regulated economy might be avoided by
moral crusaders, who often explicitly frame their campaigns as a benet to broad capital-
ism.19 More broadly, we give a central role to the interaction between the legal system and
regulation as both are seen as limiting and punishing deviant business actions.
There are several episodes where regulation is put into place as a result of considerable
public anxiety. The classic case is the Sherman Act of 1890, which laid the basis of the reg-
17This may be the consequence of a purely rational Bayesian calculation in which the prior belief shifts
upwards towards higher (better or nicer) types, but it can also be the consequence of basic psychological
mechanisms (nice people dont do this kind of thing)
18Anecdotal evidence is consistent with this interpretation: after the Enron scandal in 2002 there was
heightened regulation even though a Republican administration was in place (including additional funding for
the Securities and Exchange Commission, Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, etc). Note that authors who see these
reforms as insu¢ cient, like Conrad (2004), discuss how policymakers undercut pressures for more reforms
during this period.
19Eliot Spitzer was a recent example of a tradition that goes back at least to Teddy Roosevelt.
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ulation of big business in America. Our reading of this episode is that its political support
originated in perceptions of their abusivenature rather than the possibility of their intro-
ducing ine¢ ciencies by restricting trade. One example is John D. Rockefellers Standard Oil
trust. Various practices that reinforced an ability to charge high prices made the concern the
target for attacks. These were discussed in the press and the muckrakerswritings, including
Ida Tarbells 1902 popular series on Standard Oil in McClures Magazine (later compiled in a
book History of Standard Oil Company). Starting in 1904, the States led a series of lawsuits
(13 in 1906 alone) which ended in a Federal district court decision to break up the Standard
Oil Company into its component companies. Although doubts remain as to the impact of the
separation on its conduct, it is clear that the motivation for regulation in this case is unlikely
to have been a preoccupation with e¢ ciency (particularly when there are e¢ ciencies to be
gained on the cost side as scale is increased). Wildavsky and Tenenbaum (1981) describe
this and other episodes where high prices led to widespread mistrust between the public (and
politicians) and the oil industry. In particular, it describes the public reactions to the rst
oil shock and the subsequent debates over how much of these increases could be justied by
dwindling oil and gas reserves (versus taking advantage of the increases engineered by the
OPEC cartel).
8 Conclusions
In this model we have analyzed the role of emotions in the demand for regulating monopolies.
The root assumption is that consumers get angry when they think that a rm is charging
abusiveor exploitativeprices (or more generally, when they see agents they dislike doing
well). We model this as consumers that experience utility from consumption at low prices
(a standard material payo¤) and disutility from observing high prots in the hands of rms
that have displayed low levels of altruism towards their clients (an emotional payo¤). In the
context of a simple monopolistic competition model, this implies that rms experience large
drops in demand when their activities (e.g., price selections) irritate consumers. We show
that market equilibrium in these circumstances displays a series of interesting properties. For
example, in some circumstances, even with a very low proportion of truly altruistic rms,
most rms in the market charge a low price in order to appear to be kind, as in Rotemberg
(2008). An important feature of the equilibrium is that, as the number of rms in the market
drops, switching to a rm who has not raised prices becomes more costly to the consumer,
and the threat to punish unkind rms by not making a purchase becomes less credible. This
leads to price increases by rms, which in turn leads to anger.
The main result of the paper is that, under a reasonable set of circumstances, public anger
is more likely under monopoly than under (oligopolistic) competition. This introduces a new
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normative justication for regulation of monopoly: by reducing the prots of rms revealed
to be unkind, anger of captive consumers (and of the public that is witness to the abuses)
falls and welfare is increased. More precisely, regulation helps through the standard chan-
nels (increasing output when it is valuable), a purely emotional channel (captive consumers
are less angry as unkind rms earn less in prots), and a mixed channel (individuals who
were out of the market as they were too angry in the unregulated market, decide to purchase
and reduce the standard distortions described in the rst channel). The anger mechanism
emphasized here suggests that rms will invest resources in trying to appear kind, perhaps
developing professionals devoted to public relations, or by advertising campaigns empha-
sizing the founders identity (in contrast to the anonymous set of shareholders) or through
philanthropy (see, for example, the evidence collected in Marchand, 1992).
As a consequence of these features, the model can be used to justify the regulation of
monopoly. Given the new mechanisms highlighted, it can also be used to choose between
di¤erent regulatory approaches, such as anti-trust versus regulatory agencies or between regu-
latory instruments, such as nes versus price regulation. More generally, given our assumption
that emotional payo¤s play a role, the optimal reaction to small restrictions in output under
monopoly (a small Harberger triangle) and high bureaucratic costs of setting up regulatory
agencies may still be to regulate. This ts well with the fact that we often wish to regulate
utilities (like Water and Sewage), even though it is clear that high prices bring about small
reductions in output. Given this, some authors have opted for introducing a weight in the
social welfare function that can yield a small inuence of rm prots on regulated price (see,
for example, La¤ont and Tirole, 1993). The results in this paper could be used to formally
justify the inclusion of such low weight on prots, hopefully providing some guide on how to
estimate them through experimental methods.
9 Appendix
In this appendix we show that consumer utility and price are higher in an oligopoly than in
a monopoly.
9.0.1 Higher Utility in Oligopoly (always satised).
As long as p  s  1
2
; demand in a monopoly market is determined by the marginal consumer,
the consumer who is indi¤erent betwen buying and not: s   p   x = 0: This is as opposed
to a situation in which demand is determined by the consumer who is indi¤erent between
buying from rm i; or from rm i+1: The problem of the monopolist is then that of choosing
p  s  1
2
to maximize (p  c) 2 (s  p), which yields pm = c+s
2
: This price falls in the correct
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range p  s  1
2
, c+s
2
 s  1
2
, s  c+ 1: If s  c+ 1; then pm = s  1
2
: That is
pm =
(
c+s
2
s  c+ 1
s  1
2
s  c+ 1 : (16)
Consumer utility is then:
U = 2
R s p
0
(s  p  x) dx = (p  s)2 = (s  c)
2
4
when s  c+ 1: If s  c+ 1; utility is
U = 2
R 1
2
0
(s  p  x) dx = s  p  1
4
=
1
4
:
We will see later that consumer utility in an oligopoly when the market is covered is
s   c   5
4
b: For this number to be larger than in a monopoly for all b; we need the following
two conditions:
 s  c  5
8
 1
4
, s  c  7
8
(for s  c+ 1). So no restrictions here.
 and s   c   5
8
 (s c)2
4
, s   c  1
2
p
2
p
3 + 2 (for s  c + 1). So no restrictions here
either.
9.0.2 Higher price in monopoly (impossible)
Since the oligopoly price is b+c and the monopoly price is given by equation (16), the oligopoly
price is lower than the monopoly price for all b i¤ c+ 1
2
 c+s
2
if s  c+1 (so this is impossible)
or c+ 1
2
 s  1
2
if s  c+ 1 (so this is also impossible).
That is: price is higher in the Salop oligopoly.
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